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This study examines the association between financial expert CEOs and earnings management 
(EM) around initial public offerings. We identify financial expert CEOs as those having past experience 
in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles. We find strong 
evidence that newly listed firms with financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in either accrual-
based or real EM in the offering year than those with non-financial expert CEOs. In particular, our 
results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue that occurs due to non-random 
matching of CEOs to firms. In addition, we employ alternative measures of financial expertise, including 
past experience in a CFO position, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications. We 
document that CEOs who used to work as CFOs and those who gained varied financial experience are 
less likely to manage earnings through both accruals and real activities. Moreover, CEOs who have a 
professional qualification in finance and/or accounting are also associated with lower accrual-based EM.  
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Earnings are widely used by investors to evaluate firms’ prospective performance and 
managers are tempted to manipulate earnings to influence short-term stock prices. The incentives 
to engage in earnings management (EM) are stronger around initial public offerings (IPOs) due 
to the high level of information asymmetry between managers and investors. Prior research on 
EM around IPOs has provided evidence for positive abnormal accruals in the year of issue and a 
negative relation between at-issue abnormal accruals and post-issue long-run stock performance, 
suggesting that managers manipulate earnings to mislead investors (Aharony, Lin, & Loeb, 
1993; DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2004; Friedlan, 1994; Gramlich & Sorensen, 2004; 
Roosenbloom & van de Goot, 2003; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998a; Teoh, Wong, & Rao, 
1998b). 
Given the prevalence of the EM issue, researchers have extensively explored the 
determinants of EM, such as firm-level factors (e.g., firm size, firm performance, leverage, 
growth, corporate governance, financing needs, and target beating) and external factors (e.g., 
capital requirements and regulations; see Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010, for a review). In the 
IPO context, several studies suggest the significance of external parties such as auditors, 
underwriters, venture capitalists, and credit rating agencies in restraining EM by IPO firms 
(Gounopoulos & Pham, 2017; Hochberg, 2012; Lee & Masulis, 2011; Morsfield & Tan, 2006; 
Venkataraman, Weber, & Willenborg, 2008; Wongsunwai, 2013). Moreover, increasing 
attention has been paid to examining manager-level factors driving EM. Research on the effects 
of managerial characteristics on accounting choices is primarily based on the upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which postulates that managerial 
background characteristics may partially influence top managers’ decision-making and 
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organizational outcomes. Prior literature has documented the link between earnings quality and 
several managerial characteristics such as CEO reputation (Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, & Zang, 
2008), superstar CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2009) and managerial ability (Demerjian, Lev, 
Lewis, & McVay, 2013). However, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of CEOs’ financial 
experience on EM around IPOs remains unexplored. 
The financial career background of CEOs may play an important role in determining the 
quality of financial reporting. The financial skills and experience that CEOs have accumulated 
over their career equip them with deeper understanding of financial and accounting issues, which 
they may draw upon to make proper accounting decisions and improve the financial reporting 
process. Moreover, extensive experience and interaction with the financial market make financial 
expert CEOs highly aware of the type of information demanded by investors and appreciative of 
the significance of accounting information in affecting investors’ firm evaluation (Custódio & 
Metzger, 2014). Thus, financial expert CEOs may have more incentives to provide high-quality 
financial reporting to the market so that investors can appropriately gauge the firms’ values. 
Furthermore, although CEOs are not directly involved in overseeing the accounting process, 
they can set the tone from the top and influence the decisions of chief financial officers (CFOs) 
(Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin, 2011). The financial background facilitates communication between 
CEOs and CFOs, allowing them to effectively work together to develop sound accounting 
policies. Moreover, financial expert CEOs who hold a professional qualification are required to 
adhere to ethical codes of conduct, considerably influencing their risk attitudes towards greater 
conservatism in financial reporting. In addition, detection of financial reporting 
misrepresentations will adversely affect the reputation of financial expert CEOs. Thus, 
reputational concerns may restrain financial expert CEOs from managing earnings. 
4 
 
Therefore, we are interested in investigating whether the variation in the EM of IPO firms 
is partially attributable to CEOs’ past financial experience. We collect detailed CEO profiles of 
our sample of U.S. common share IPOs over the period 2003–2011 from Boardex. Based on 
CEOs’ employment histories, we categorize financial expert CEOs as those having past 
experience in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles, 
such as an accountant, a treasurer, a vice president (VP) of finance, and a CFO. We find that IPO 
firms with a financial expert CEO are less likely to engage in both accrual-based and real EM 
around IPOs. In addition, we employ the propensity score matching method to address the 
potential endogenous selection bias issue that occurs due to the non-random matching of CEOs 
to firms and the correlation of unobserved firm and/or CEO characteristics with CEOs’ financial 
experience. Our results still hold after controlling for endogenous selection. 
Moreover, investigating the interaction effect between financial expert CEOs and CEO 
power, we document that CEO power significantly enhances the impacts of financial expert 
CEOs on accrual-based EM. This suggests that although CEOs are not directly responsible for 
overseeing the financial reporting process, financial expert CEOs’ decision-making power allows 
them to more effectively influence CFOs’ decisions. In addition, we employ several different 
measures of financial expertise, including past experience in a CFO position, financial 
experience variety, and professional qualifications. We find a negative relationship between 
CEOs’ past experience as a CFO and both accrual-based and real EM. In regard to the variety of 
financial experience, we employ the principal component analysis to measure an index for 
financial experience variety that takes four aspects of CEOs’ financial work experience into 
account (a) the number of firms in which the CEO acquired financial experience, (b) the number 
of financial roles in which the CEO worked, (c) whether the CEO had financial experience in 
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another firm, and (d) the duration of the financial experience. We document that CEOs with 
varied financial experience are associated with lower accrual-based and real EM. Additionally, in 
examining the effects of CEOs with a professional qualification on EM, we find that accrual-
based EM is significantly lower when the CEO holds a professional qualification in accounting 
and/or finance. 
Our study makes several contributions to the EM, IPO, and management literature. First, 
it adds to the growing literature on determinants of EM by highlighting CEOs’ financial 
experience as a new dimension of influencing factors to be further explored in future research. 
Prior literature has documented the significance of CEOs’ past managerial experience on 
accounting choices. For example, Demerjian et al. (2013) argue that managerial ability is 
positively related to earnings quality. They measure the ability of managers based on the extent 
of their efficiency in utilizing the firm’s resources. Our research is distinguishable from their 
study, as we examine a different perspective of managerial skills—that is, the functional 
experience of CEOs and, specifically, their career background in finance. With regard to 
financial experience, Custódio and Metzger (2014) document the impact of financial expert 
CEOs on firms’ financial policies, such as cash holdings, debts, and share purchases. We provide 
additional evidence of the relevance of CEOs’ financial experience to firms’ accounting 
decisions. 
Another paper close to ours is the one by Jiang et al. (2013) that documents a negative 
association between CEOs with financial experience and real EM among Chinese listed firms. 
We examine the impact of financial expert CEOs on EM in the IPO context. The IPO market is a 
more favorable setting to explore the incentives of managers in undertaking EM because 
managerial opportunism is more strongly driven by information asymmetries (Dye, 1988; 
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Trueman & Titman, 1988), which are strongly manifested around IPOs. In particular, in order to 
have a comprehensive view of EM activities, we analyze both accrual-based and real EM. In 
addition, the prior literature on EM around IPOs has mainly explored the impact of external 
parties, such as auditors, reputable underwriters, venture capitalists, and credit rating agencies, 
on EM by IPO issuers (Gounopoulos & Pham, 2017; Hochberg, 2012; Lee & Masulis, 2011; 
Morsfield & Tan, 2006; Venkataraman et al., 2008; Wongsunwai, 2013). To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to provide the empirical evidence of the influence of a manager-
level factor—CEOs’ financial experience—on EM around IPOs. The paper also contributes to 
the management literature by providing evidence consistent with the upper echelons theory’s 
prediction about the effect of managerial functional experience on corporate strategic choices. 
Furthermore, our findings provide implications for investors assessing the financial reports of 
IPO firms led by financial expert CEOs and for firms considering recruiting CEOs with financial 
experience. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 explains the methodology to estimate EM and describes the 
sample. Section 4 presents the empirical model and findings of the effect of financial expert 
CEOs on EM around IPOs, while section 5 provides robustness checks. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
The study of EM around IPOs is mainly governed by consideration of agency theory. 
This theory is concerned with the principal-agent problem that arises due to conflicts of interests 
between the principals (e.g., shareholders), who provide capital for the firm, and the agent (e.g., 
company executives), who manage day-to-day activities of the firm, in the presence of 
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information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Information asymmetry creates an adverse 
selection problem, which happens when inside managers have access to relevant information not 
made available to outsiders, and a moral hazard issue, which occurs when managers behave 
inappropriately from the perspective of less informed investors. 
The IPO market is characterized by a high level of information asymmetry. Public 
information about an IPO firm is scarce and often limited to the prospectus, leaving market 
participants with much uncertainty about the firm. The information disparity creates strong 
incentives for self-interested managers to maximize their gain by overstating earnings to 
influence stock prices (Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). Prior literature has provided evidence 
suggesting opportunistic EM around IPOs. The early studies of Aharony et al. (1993) and 
Friedlan (1994) state that managers are involved in accrual-based EM before the stock offering 
in an effort to increase reported earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a) find positive abnormal accruals in 
the year of issue and a negative association between the accruals and post-issue long-run stock 
performance, suggesting that managers manipulate earnings around IPOs to mislead investors. 
Several later studies also attest to the aggressive use of accruals around the stock issuance to 
overstate earnings (e.g., Alhadab, Clacher, & Keasey, 2014; DuCharme, 2001; DuCharme et al., 
2004; Lee & Masulis, 2011; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004; Morsfield & Tan, 2006; 
Roosenboom, van der Goot, & Mertens, 2003).2 The phenomenon of EM by IPO issuers is also 
reported in an international context, such as the Netherlands (Roosenboom et al., 2003), the 
United Kingdom (Alhadab et al., 2014; Alhadab et al., 2016), and Asian countries (Ahmad-
Zaluki, Campbell, & Goodacre, 2011; Kouwenberg & Thontirawong, 2015).  
                                                     
2 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) suggest that the stringent monitoring from various parties, such as regulators, auditors, analysts, and the press, may 
discourage IPO firms from engaging in aggressive EM. They analyze a sample of UK firms whose financial statements filed as private firms are 
comparable to those restated and included in the IPO prospectuses. They find that IPO firms are more likely to be conservative in their financial 
reporting. However, Lo (2008) argues that the restriction in the sample selection by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) may exclude firms that engage 
in EM since managers tend to hide their misbehavior by providing non-comparable reports. 
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Besides accrual-based EM, recent research has provided some evidence of real EM 
around IPOs. Darrough and Rangan (2005) document that IPO issuers overstate earnings in the 
issue year by reducing research and development (R&D) expenses. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
find that firms engage in real EM around seasoned equity offerings. Alhadab et al. (2014) studied 
IPOs in the UK market and indicate that issuers manage earnings upwards in the offering year by 
manipulating both accruals and sales. The level of EM can be explained by various firm-level 
factors (e.g., firm size, firm performance, leverage, growth, corporate governance, financing 
needs, and target beating) and external factors (e.g., capital requirements and regulations; see 
Dechow et al., 2010, for a review). Furthermore, in the IPO context, researchers highlight the 
importance of external parties, such as auditors, reputable underwriters, venture capitalists, and 
credit rating agencies, in restraining EM by IPO issuers (Gounopoulos & Pham, 2017; Hochberg, 
2012; Lee & Masulis, 2011; Morsfield & Tan, 2006; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Wongsunwai, 
2013). Surprisingly, research on the influence of managerial factors on EM around IPOs is 
scarce. 
The upper echelons theory suggests that managerial personalities, background, and 
experience, such as age, socioeconomic background, formal education, and functional track can 
partially affect managers’ interpretations of the situations and problems they have to deal with 
and, in turn, influence their decision-making (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Prior 
empirical studies document the impact of several managerial characteristics on accounting 
decisions. Bamber, John, and Yanyan (2010) argue that managers’ idiosyncratic differences play 
a significant role in firms’ voluntary financial disclosure choices. In particular, managers with 
financial, accounting, and legal backgrounds; those born before World War II; and those with 
past military service tend to be more conservative in disclosures. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
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(2010) document that individual executive effects significantly influence firms’ tax avoidance. 
Francis et al. (2008) report a negative association between earnings quality and CEO reputation. 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) investigate the behavior changes of CEOs after winning prestigious 
awards in the business press and find that EM increases considerably subsequent to the award. 
Demerjian et al. (2013) show that managerial ability is related to greater earnings quality, which 
is represented by fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings persistence, fewer errors in bad 
debt provisions, and better accrual estimations. Jiang et al. (2013) examine Chinese listed firms 
and find evidence that the appointment of CEOs with financial experience significantly reduces 
real EM and thus provides higher quality earnings information. 
Despite prior findings of the influence of managerial characteristics on accounting 
decisions, it remains an empirical question whether financial expert CEOs affect IPO firms’ 
financial reporting behaviors. Custódio and Metzger (2014) argue that financial expert CEOs 
tend to communicate accounting information more effectively to the market because they 
appreciate the importance of the information in influencing investors’ evaluation of the firm. 
Moreover, past financial experience equips financial expert CEOs with profound technical 
training and deep understanding of accounting and financial concepts and structures, which they 
may draw upon to make proper accounting decisions. Although CEOs are not directly involved 
in overseeing the accounting process and the preparation of financial statements, they may set 
the tone from the top and influence the decisions of CFOs (Feng et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
theory of top management teams (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008) 
posits that common functional backgrounds facilitate communication among top management 
team members. Therefore, the understanding of financial and accounting issues may allow 
financial expert CEOs to work more effectively with CFOs to enhance the financial reporting 
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process. In addition, reputational concerns may prevent financial expert CEOs from engaging in 
EM, as financial reporting misbehavior will reflect unfavorably on the career of a CEO with a 
track record as a financial expert. Moreover, as IPO firms face stringent monitoring from 
regulators and various parties such as auditors, investors, analysts, and the press, the reputation 
of CEOs will be severely damaged if EM activities are detected. Furthermore, if financial expert 
CEOs hold a professional qualification in accounting and/or finance, they are required to adhere 
to strict ethical codes of conduct. This affects their risk attitudes towards greater conservatism in 
financial reporting. Along with the aforementioned arguments, we predict that IPO firms with a 
financial expert CEO will exhibit lower EM in the offering year than non-financial expert CEOs. 
3. Methodology and sample description 
3.1. Earnings management estimation 
3.1.1 Accrual-based earnings management 
We measure abnormal accruals as a proxy for accrual-based EM based on the accruals 
model by Dechow and Dichev (2002), in which the short-term working capital accruals are 
regressed on present, past, and future cash flows. We follow McNichols (2002) and Francis, La 
Fond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) to take into account biases caused by long-term accruals and 
modify the model by including changes in sales and property, plant, and equipment (PPE). The 
following regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and for non-IPO firms in a two-






























































TCAi,t = (CAi,t − Cashi,t ) − (CLi,t − STDi,t ) 
CFOi,t = NIBEi,t − (TCAi,t − DEPNi,t ) 
 
TCAi,t is total current working capital accruals; CFOi,t is cash flows from operations; PPEi,t is the 
gross value of plant, property, and equipment; NIBEi,t is net income before extraordinary items; 
DEPNi,t is depreciation and amortization expenses; and TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets. ∆SALESi,t is 
the change in sales; ∆CAi,t is the change in current assets; ∆Cashi,t is the change in cash; ∆CLi,t is 
the change in current liabilities; and ∆STDi,t is the change in short-term debt. The changes are 
from the fiscal year before IPO to the fiscal year of the offering. All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile levels to mitigate the issue of outliers. The estimated coefficients of 
Equation (1) are then used to estimate the normal level of current accruals of IPO firms. An IPO 
firm’s abnormal current accruals are computed as the difference between the firm’s actual total 
current accruals and its estimated current accruals. 
3.1.2 Real earnings management 
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that managers exploit their discretion in operating 
decisions and adjust real activities to overstate earnings to avoid losses. They may offer price 
discounts or more generous credit terms to temporarily boost sales, overproduce to reduce the 
cost of goods sold, and cut discretionary expenses such as selling, general, and administrative 
(SG&A); R&D; and advertising expenses. These activities result in higher earnings; however, 
they also lead to unusually low cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses and 
unusually high production costs. We follow Roychowdhury (2006) and measure abnormal cash 
flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as 
proxies for real EM. The normal levels of cash flow from operations, productions costs, and 
discretionary expenses are estimated as follows. 
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CFOi,t is cash flows from operations; SALESi,t is total sales in the offering year; TAi,t-1 is lagged 
total assets; and ∆SALESi,t is the change in sales from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal 
year of the issue. 





+     
SALESi,t 
+   






1     
TA            
2           











PRODi,t is production costs in the offering year, computed as the sum of the cost of goods sold 
and the change in inventory from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the issue; 
SALESi,t is total sales in the offering year; TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets; ∆SALESi,t is the change in 
sales from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the issue; and, ∆SALESi,t-1 is the 
change in sales from the fiscal year two years before the IPO to the fiscal year prior to the issue. 
DISEXPi,t    
=  
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(4) 
 
DISEXPi,t is discretionary expenses in the offering year, computed as the sum of SG&A, R&D, 
and advertising expenses; TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets; and SALESi,t-1 is total sales in the fiscal 
year before the IPO. 
Equations (2), (3), and (4) are estimated for each year for non-IPO firms in a two-digit 
SIC code industry with at least 10 observations. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile levels to alleviate the problem of outliers. An IPO firm’s abnormal levels of cash flow 
from operations, productions costs, and discretionary expenses are computed as the difference 
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between the firm’s actual levels and its estimated levels, measured using the coefficients from 
regressions (2), (3), and (4), respectively. We also multiply the abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one for the real EM metrics to have 
the same interpretation as the accrual-based EM proxy; i.e., higher values indicate higher EM. 
Furthermore, we match real EM estimates of IPO firms to those of non-IPO counterparts based 
on year, industry, and ROA to produce performance-matched real EM measures. In addition, 
following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we calculate REM1 and REM2 to measure the combined 
effects of individual real EM tools. REM1 is computed as the sum of abnormal production costs 
and abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 as the sum of abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses.3 The higher values of these measures suggest 
higher levels of real EM. 
3.2. Sample description 
We retrieve our sample of U.S. common-share IPOs over the period January 1, 2003, to 
December 31, 2011, from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database.4 
Following prior IPO literature, we exclude IPOs with an offer price below $5 per share, limited 
partnerships, unit offerings, rights issues, American depositary receipts (ADRs), leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), spin-offs, 
privatizations, and financial institutions. We then match the sample with Compustat to obtain 
accounting data. Our final sample consists of 467 IPO firms. Furthermore, we collect 
                                                     
3 We do not combine abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flows from operations to avoid double-counting, as activities causing high 
abnormal production costs also result in low abnormal cash flow from operations (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
4 We start our sample from 2003, as we focus on examining EM around IPOs after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). The U.S. Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 as a response to various corporate accounting scandals such as the cases of Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s. 
The Act includes many stringent regulations to strengthen financial disclosures and improve corporate governance practices. Lobo and Zhou 
(2006) find that the SEC’s requirement for financial statements to be certified by CEOs and CFOs influences managerial behaviors towards 
greater conservatism in financial reporting. Furthermore, Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) also report a decrease in accrual-based EM in the post-
Sarbanes Oxley period. 
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information on CEOs’ employment histories from Boardex. Following Custódio and Metzger 
(2014), we define financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in either banking or 
investment firms, large auditing firms (Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
Arthur Andersen, Coopers, and Touche Ross), or finance-related roles (e.g., accountant, 
treasurer, VP of finance, and CFO). There are 127 financial expert CEOs in our sample. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of our IPO sample from 2003 to 2011 by issue year and 
industry. The majority of IPOs is concentrated from 2004 to 2007, which is consistent with the 
recovery of the U.S. economy after the early 2000s recession. Subsequently, the IPO activity 
shows a considerable decline due to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, before gradually 
improving again from 2010. Moreover, approximately 40% of IPO firms are clustered in the 
computer and high-tech industries (SIC codes 35, 36, 38, and 73). 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our overall IPO sample and the sub-samples of 
IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert CEOs. We winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to mitigate the issue of outliers. Panel 
A shows the descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics. With regard to financial expertise, on 
average, 27% of the CEOs have prior financial experience. Notably, 11% used to work as a CFO, 
5% as a banker, 3% as an auditor, 2% as an accountant, 5% as a treasurer, 3% as a VP of finance, 
and 13% in other financial roles. Furthermore, 5% of the CEOs also hold a professional 
qualification in finance and/or accounting such as the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), the 
Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA), the Certified Public Accountant (CPA), and the 
Certified Management Accountant (CMA). In addition, 7% of the CEOs are firm founders, while 
45% are also the chairman of the board. In general, the CEOs have been managing the firm for 
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around five years and own roughly 11% of the firm before the offering. Moreover, 15% of the 
CEOs graduated from an Ivy League institution. The percentages of CEOs holding dual positions 
as a CEO and a chairman, and of those being Ivy League graduates, are significantly larger for 
the sample of IPOs with a financial expert CEO (50% and 20%, respectively) than those with a 
non-financial expert CEO (43% and 13%, respectively). 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Panel B illustrates firm and offering characteristics for all IPOs, IPO firms with a 
financial expert CEO, and IPO firms with a non-financial expert CEO. On average, IPO firms are 
19 years old and have total assets of 475 million dollars, while their market value at the time of 
listing is 568 million dollars. In general, 68% of IPOs are underwritten by top-tier investment 
banks, 85% are audited by Big Four accounting firms, and 53% are venture-backed. In addition, 
IPO firms have the mean leverage ratio of 0.78, while the ratio of R&D to total assets is 0.12 and 
the return on assets (ROA) is -0.26. As they are generally unprofitable, the mean ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity is also negative (- 0.58). Moreover, in terms of diversification, 18% of 
firms operate in more than one business segment. Compared to IPO firms with a non-financial 
expert CEO, those with a financial expert CEO have a lower leverage ratio (mean leverage ratio 
of 0.69 versus 0.81) and are less R&D intensive (mean ratio of R&D to total assets of 0.10 
versus 0.13). There is also a lower proportion of IPO firms with a financial expert CEO being 
supported by venture capitalists (46% versus 55%). 
With respect to EM proxies, we rely on medians for statistical inferences because 
medians are less likely than means to be influenced by extreme observations. The median value 
of abnormal accruals (0.01) is significantly positive, suggesting that IPO firms tend to engage in 
income- increasing accrual-based EM. This finding is consistent with prior EM literature, which 
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documents aggressive accrual-based EM around IPOs. In regard to real EM, IPO firms have 
significantly positive abnormal cash flow from operations (0.01), yet negative abnormal 
production costs (-0.07), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.23), REM1 (-0.21), and REM2 (-
0.20). This indicates that issuers are inclined to overstate earnings through sales manipulation but 
are conservative in production and discretionary expense decisions. The finding that IPO firms 
engage in sales-based EM besides accrual-based EM is in line with earlier research (e.g., 
Alhadab et al., 2014). 
IPO firms with a non-financial expert CEO also exhibit significantly positive abnormal 
accruals (0.01) and abnormal cash flow from operations (0.02), but negative abnormal 
production costs (- 0.06), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.19), REM1 (-0.16), and REM2 (-
0.14). On the other hand, for IPO firms with a financial expert CEO, the abnormal accruals and 
the abnormal cash flow from operations are not significantly different from zero. This suggests 
that IPO firms with a financial expert CEO do not appear to manipulate accruals and sales to 
inflate earnings in the offering year. In addition, they have significantly negative abnormal 
production costs (-0.13), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.29), REM1 (-0.37), and REM2 (-
0.31), indicating that issuers with a financial expert CEO tend to be conservative in managing 
earnings through production and discretionary expenses. In particular, compared to firms with a 
non-financial expert CEO, firms with a financial expert CEO have significantly lower abnormal 
accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, REM1, and REM2. 
Overall, our initial univariate results show that IPO firms with a financial expert CEO 
exhibit lower accrual-based and real EM in the issue year than those with a non-financial expert 
CEO. In order to provide more concrete empirical evidence, we conduct multivariate analysis of 
the association between financial expert CEOs and EM, controlling for various EM determinants, 
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in the next section. Panel C of Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in our 
analysis. No multicollinearity is detected among the variables. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Empirical model 
We estimate the following model to investigate the association between financial expert 
CEOs and EM. 
  
 (5) 
The dependent variable EM is an earning management proxy including abnormal 
accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, REM1, and REM2. The variable of interest financial expert CEO is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has financial work experience and zero otherwise. We 
then control for several firm characteristics that are suggested by earlier studies as important 
determinants of EM. Log(age) is the logarithm of one plus firm age. Firm age (in years) is 
measured as the difference between the firm’s IPO year and its founding year. Younger firms 
appear to have more volatile earnings and less solid accounting systems, creating more 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings. Log(assets) is the logarithm of total assets and is 
used as a proxy for firm size. Larger firms have more complex financial structures, which bring 
more room for managers’ discretion over accounting policies; yet, these firms are exposed to 
closer scrutiny from regulators and market participants, which may discourage managers from 
financial reporting misbehavior. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Leverage tends 
to be positively linked with EM, as firms that are close to debt covenant violations are more 
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likely to engage in EM to overstate earnings (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Franz, HassabElnaby, 
& Lobo, 2014). We also account for the influence of firm performance on EM by including the 
firm’s ROA (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).  
In addition, financial intermediaries participating in the IPO process can exert their 
impact on EM performed by IPO issuers. In particular, Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) and Lee and 
Masulis (2011) document that the reputational issue creates strong incentives for top-tier 
investment banks to detect financial reporting misrepresentations. Morsfield and Tan (2006), 
Hochberg (2012), and Wongsunwai (2013) find that the monitoring by venture capitalists also 
restrains EM around IPOs. Moreover, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998), 
Krishnan (2003), and Gul, Fung, and Jaggi (2009) report that the higher quality audit provided 
by Big Four accounting firms discourages managers from manipulating earnings. Therefore, we 
control for the effects of reputable underwriters, venture capitalists, and Big Four auditors on EM 
by including the dummy variables Top-tier underwriter, Venture capitalist, and Big4 auditor, 
which indicate the involvement of these financial intermediaries in the IPO. 
4.2. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents our OLS regression analysis of the association between financial expert 
CEOs and EM around IPOs. In the regression of abnormal accruals on financial expert CEOs, 
the coefficient on the variable financial expert CEO is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This strongly suggests that financial expert CEOs are associated with lower accrual-
based EM in the offering year. The signs of control variables are generally in line with prior 
literature. Specifically, at-issue abnormal accruals are negatively linked with firm size and 
venture backing, and positively related to leverage and ROA. In the regressions of real EM 
proxies on financial expert CEOs, we also find significantly negative coefficients on the variable 
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financial expert CEO across each of the specifications, indicating the negative relationship 
between financial expert CEOs and real EM around IPOs. Overall, the results provide evidence 
supporting our hypothesis that IPO firms with a financial expert CEO are less likely to engage in 
both accrual-based and real EM in the issue year. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1. Endogeneity control 
IPO issuers that are committed to providing high-quality financial information to 
investors may prefer to hire managers with prior financial experience. Meanwhile, managers 
with financial backgrounds may be inclined to draw upon their past experience to make 
accounting choices. The endogeneity of CEO selection makes it unclear whether the differences 
in EM are attributable to CEOs with financial experience or due to the non-random assignment 
of CEOs to firms. Therefore, we address the concern about endogenous CEO–firm matching by 
employing the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure. Using this method, we can compare 
the EM of a firm that appoints a financial expert CEO with that of the same firm if it had 
appointed a non-financial expert CEO. To perform the matching, we measure the propensity 
score, which is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment (i.e., having a financial 
expert CEO) given a firm’s pre-treatment characteristics for all the IPO firms by estimating a 
probit regression for the likelihood of firms having a financial expert CEO. 
Custódio and Metzger (2014) document that financial expert CEOs are more likely to be 
matched to firms in the mature stage of their life cycles, while non-financial expert CEOs are 
more likely to be appointed by growth firms. Therefore, in the probit regression, we control for 
firm characteristics associated with firms’ life cycle, including log(age), log(assets), ROA, R&D, 
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retained earnings, diversification, and business segment. We then match each observation in the 
treated group with the control group based on the propensity score obtained from the predicted 
probability taken from the first-stage probit estimation. 
Table 4 presents the results of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) on EM 
for IPO firms with a financial expert CEO versus those with a non-financial expert CEO. The 
ATET is negative and significant across all specifications, with different EM proxies as 
dependent variables. This finding is consistent with the results presented previously in our OLS 
regressions, which indicate that IPO firms with a financial expert CEO are associated with 
significantly lower accrual-based and real EM. 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
We also check the robustness of our results using other commonly used econometric 
methods for addressing the selection problem, including Heckman’s (1979) two-step treatment-
effect, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect, and two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable (2SLS IV). These approaches all require the estimation of a selection 
model accounting for the assignment of financial expert CEOs to firms. In the selection model, 
we include firm characteristics similar to those used in the PSM discussed above; namely, 
log(age), log(assets), ROA, R&D, retained earnings, diversification, and business segment. 
For the two-step treatment effect model, in the first stage, we estimate the selection equation 
using a probit regression of the likelihood that a firm appoints a financial expert CEO. The 
estimated self-selection correction term, i.e., the inverse Mills ratio, is added to the outcome 
regression (equation 5), and the linear outcome regression is estimated as normal. For the MLE 
model, both the selection and the outcome regressions are estimated simultaneously by 
maximum likelihood estimation. For the 2SLS IV model, in the first stage, we estimate the 
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regression of the endogenous variable financial expert CEO on exogenous variables in equation 
(5) and firm characteristics that may influence the likelihood of firms having a financial expert 
CEO, including R&D, retained earnings, diversification, and business segment. In the second 
stage, we run the outcome regression (equation 5) with the endogenous variable being replaced 
by the fitted value from the first-stage regression. We document consistent results (unreported) 
with the main OLS regressions, suggesting that having a financial expert CEO is negatively 
related to accrual-based and real EM around IPOs. 
5.2. Interaction effect between CEO financial experience and CEO power 
Prior research suggests that CEOs with greater decision-making power can impose 
significant impacts on corporate financial strategies (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Chikh 
& Filbien, 2011; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 
2013). Moreover, CEOs may set the tone from the top and influence CFOs’ decisions (Feng et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the influence of financial expert CEOs on EM may be more pronounced if 
the CEOs have more power over the board and other executives. We measure CEO power by 
employing the four dimensions suggested by Finkelstein (1992) and widely used in prior studies 
on CEO power (e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Chikh & Filbien, 2011; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013): 
structural, ownership, expertise, and prestige power. 
Structural power is based on the organizational structure. The authority earned at a higher 
rank allows managers to have a greater degree of control over their subordinates. To proxy for 
structural power, we use CEO-Chairman, which indicates whether the CEO also holds the 
position of the chairman of the board. In regard to ownership power, managers are in a stronger 
position in the agent–principal relationship if they have more ownership in the firm. In addition, 
being a founder of the firm also strengthens the relationship between the CEO and the board. 
22 
 
Thus, to proxy for ownership power, we use CEO ownership, which is the percentage of shares 
owned by the CEO before the offering, and CEO-Founder, which indicates whether the CEO is 
also the firm founder. 
In terms of expertise power, the relevant expertise that is critical to the organization 
allows managers to more effectively handle both internal and external factors influencing 
organizational success. CEOs’ understanding of the firm accumulates over the time that they 
work in the firm. Therefore, we use CEO tenure, which is the duration of the CEO’s service in 
the firm, as a proxy for expertise power.  
With regard to prestige power, managerial prestige enhances the power of managers in 
many ways; for example, by conveying to other executives their personal importance and adding 
value to the firm through their external connections. CEOs who graduated from an Ivy League 
institution not only possess a top qualification, but also tend to have more powerful friends and 
contacts. Hence, we use Ivy League graduate, which indicates whether the CEO is a graduate of 
an Ivy League institution, as a proxy for prestige power. 
We standardize and aggregate the five variables (i.e., CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, 
CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy League graduate) to generate the variable CEO power, 
which accounts for the effects of all four sources of managerial power. We then create an 
interaction term between financial expert CEO and CEO power, and run the main regression 
(equation 5) including the interaction effect. The results are presented in Table 5. The 
coefficients on the variable financial expert CEO remain negative and significant in all 
specifications, with different EM proxies as dependent variables. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is significantly negative in the regression with abnormal accruals as a 
dependent variable, but not in the regressions with real EM proxies as dependent variables. This 
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indicates that CEO power significantly strengthens the effect of financial expert CEOs on 
accrual-based EM, but not real EM. The findings support the argument that although CEOs are 
not directly responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, their decision-making 
power allows them to effectively exert their influence on CFOs’ financial reporting decisions. 
Therefore, the impact of a financial expert CEO on reducing accrual-based EM is more 
pronounced when the CEO is more powerful. However, as CEOs are directly in charge of 
making decisions on operating activities, CEO power does not significantly enhance the extent to 
which financial expert CEOs exercise their discretion in operating decisions to influence 
earnings. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
5.3. Alternative measures of financial experience 
In the main analysis, we define financial experience broadly as past work experience in a 
banking or investment firm, a large auditing firm, or a finance-related role. In this section, we 
examine alternative measures of financial expertise. Specifically, we investigate whether EM 
around IPOs is influenced by CEOs who have past experience as a CFO, a wide variety of 
financial experience, or professional qualifications in finance and/or accounting. We run the 
regressions of EM on the variables CFO experience, financial experience variety dummy, and 
professional qualification, controlling for the same firm characteristics as in the main regression 
model (equation 5). 
The results are presented in Table 6. Panel A shows the regressions of the effect of CFO 
experience on accrual-based and real EM. The coefficients on CFO experience are negative and 
significant in every specification, except for the one with abnormal discretionary expenses as a 
dependent variable. The results indicate that CEOs who used to work as a CFO are less likely to 
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manipulate earnings through accruals, sales, production, and a combination of activities related 
to sales, production, and discretionary expenses. 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Panel B displays the regression analyses of the impact of CEOs’ financial experience 
variety on EM around IPOs. To measure the variety of financial experience, we consider four 
aspects of CEOs’ financial work histories: (a) the number of firms in which the CEO acquired 
financial experience, (b) the number of finance- and accounting-related positions in which the 
CEO worked, (c) whether the CEO obtained financial experience in another firm, and (d) the 
duration of the financial experience. For each of these aspects, a higher value indicates greater 
financial experience variety. We employ the principal component analysis (PCA) method to 
extract common components from the four variables. Using one variable instead of four variables 
individually mitigates the multicollinearity problem, reduces measurement errors, and enhances 
the power of regression tests. The variables used to proxy for financial experience variety are 
highly correlated, which is desirable since the common factor generated by PCA will better 
summarize their effects. The PCA method generates one component with an eigenvalue higher 
than one (i.e., 3.433). The financial experience variety index is the first factor of the PCA of the 
four proxies. As expected, all four variables have positive loadings and are positively correlated 
with the index. Based on the financial experience variety index, we create an indicator variable, 
financial experience variety dummy, which takes the value of one if the CEO’s financial 
experience variety index is greater than the overall median. We then run the regressions of EM 
proxies on financial experience variety dummy and the same set of controls as in the main 
regression (equation 5). The coefficients on financial experience variety dummy are negative and 
significant in all specifications except for the one with Abnormal discretionary expenses as a 
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dependent variable. This indicates that CEOs with more varied financial experience are less 
likely to engage in EM through accruals, sales, production, and a combination of real activities. 
Panel C presents the regressions of the association between EM and CEOs with a 
professional qualification in accounting and/or finance (e.g., CFA, ACCA, CPA, CMA). In order 
to gain the accreditation by a professional body, qualification holders need to obtain required 
skills, knowledge, and practical experience, as well as adhere to ethical codes of conduct. Thus, 
CEOs who are charter holders are expected to have a thorough understanding of finance and 
accounting and possess high levels of professional ethics. In the specification with abnormal 
accruals as a dependent variable, the coefficient on professional qualification is significant and 
negative, suggesting that CEOs with a professional qualification are linked with lower accrual-
based EM. However, the association between the existence of a professional qualification and 
real EM is not significant. Thus, having a CEO with a professional qualification significantly 
reduces accrual-based EM around IPOs, but not real EM. 
5.4. Alternative estimation of abnormal accruals 
In the main analysis, we employ the accruals model by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to 
measure abnormal accruals. For robustness, we estimate abnormal accruals using the modified 
Jones (1991) model described in Dechow et al. (1995). We run the following regression for each 






























TACCi,t is total accruals computed as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, less cash flow from operations.5 TAi.t-1 is lagged total assets, and ∆SALESi,t is the 
                                                     
5 Following Hribar and Collins (2002), we compute total accruals using the cash flow approach to avoid the non-articulation problem of the 
balance sheet method. 
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change in total sales from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the offering, while 
PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and equipment. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. The expected component 
of total accruals (NACCi.t) for the IPO sample is computed using the coefficient estimates from 
equation (6), as follows: 
 1      SALES  − REC  PPE 








i,t −1 i,t −1 i,t −1 
(7) 
 
∆RECi.t is the change in receivables from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the 
offering. The abnormal accruals are computed as the difference between total accruals and 
expected accruals. In addition, in order to mitigate the potential correlation between the 
abnormal accruals measured using the Jones model and firm performance (Dechow et al. 1995), 
we employ the performance matching procedure suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) to match an 
IPO firm to a non-IPO firm in the same two-digit SIC industry and year with the closest ROA in 
the fiscal year before the offering. We allow a difference in ROA within the range of +/-10% of 
the IPO firm’s ROA. The matched firm’s abnormal accruals are deducted from the IPO firm’s 
abnormal accruals to obtain the performance-matched abnormal accruals for the IPO firm. 
Employing the alternative estimation of abnormal accruals does not change our main findings. In 
unreported results, we continue to document the negative relationship between financial expert 
CEOs and accrual-based EM around IPOs. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides novel empirical evidence for the association between financial expert 
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CEOs and EM around IPOs. Financial experience provides CEOs with profound insights into 
financial and accounting issues, which allows them to make sound accounting decisions. 
Financial background also helps CEOs to work more effectively with CFOs to enhance the 
financial reporting process. Moreover, past experience in the financial market makes financial 
expert CEOs highly aware of the importance of accounting information in allowing investors to 
derive a firm’s value. Reputational concerns also restrain financial expert CEOs from financial 
reporting misbehavior. Therefore, financial expert CEOs are more incentivized to provide higher 
quality financial reporting to the market. 
In our analysis, we identify financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in 
banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles. Our main findings 
indicate that IPO firms with a financial expert CEO are less likely to engage in accrual-based and 
real EM in the offering year. In particular, the impact of financial expert CEOs on accrual-based 
EM is more pronounced when the CEO has greater decision-making power. Our findings remain 
consistent after controlling for the potential endogenous CEO–firm matching. Moreover, we 
check the robustness of our results with different measures of financial expertise, including prior 
experience as a CFO, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications in finance 
and/or accounting. We continue to find that CEOs who used to work as a CFO and those who 
gained financial experience in various firms, financial roles, and for a longer period of time are 
less likely to manage earnings through accruals and real activities. Having a CEO with a 
professional qualification is negatively associated with lower accrual-based EM in the offering 
year. The overall evidence suggests the significance of financial expert CEOs in reducing EM by 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A: CEO characteristics  
Variable Definition 
CEO tenure Number of years working as a CEO in the firm. 
CEO-Chairman Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, zero 
otherwise. 
CEO-Founder Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also a founder of the firm, zero otherwise. 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO before the offering. 
Ivy League graduate Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a graduate of an Ivy League institution, zero 
otherwise. 
CFO experience Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has past experience in a CFO position, zero 
otherwise. 
Professional qualification Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO holds a professional qualification in finance 
and/or accounting (e.g. CFA, ACCA, CPA, CMA). 
Financial expert CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has past financial experience in either a 
banking or investment firm, in a large auditing firm (e.g., Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Coopers, Touche Ross), or in a finance-related role 
(e.g., accountant, treasurer, VP of finance, CFO); zero otherwise. 
Financial experience variety index First factor of applying the principal component analysis to four proxies of the variety of 
financial experience: (a) the number of firms in which the CEO gained past financial 
experience, (b) the number of finance and accounting related roles in which the CEO 
worked, (c) whether the CEO had financial experience in another firm, and (d) the duration 
of the financial experience. 
Financial experience variety dummy Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO’s financial experience variety index is above 
the overall median, zero otherwise. 
Panel B: Firm characteristics  
Variable Definition 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal accruals in the offering year, computed using the modified Jones (1991) model 
and adjusted for the abnormal accruals of a performance-matched, non-IPO firm based on 
year, industry, and ROA according to the performance matching procedure suggested by 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
Abnormal cash flow from operations Abnormal cash flow from operations in the offering year, estimated following 
Roychowdhury (2006). The value is multiplied by negative one. 
Abnormal production costs Abnormal production costs in the offering year, estimated following  Roychowdhury 
(2006). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses Abnormal discretionary expenses in the offering year, estimated following Roychowdhury 
(2006). The value is multiplied by negative one. 
REM1 Aggregate level of real earnings management in the offering year, calculated as the sum of 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
REM2 Aggregate level of real earnings management in the offering year, calculated as the sum of 
abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Firm age Firm age in years, calculated as the difference between the firm’s IPO year and its founding 
year. Company founding years are retrieved from the Field-Ritter dataset.* 
Log(age) Logarithm of one plus firm age. 
Market value Market value at the time of the listing. 
    * The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm
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Total assets Total assets in the fiscal year before the offering. 
Log(assets) Logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets in the fiscal year before the offering. 
ROA Return on assets calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets in the fiscal year before 
the offering. 
Big4 auditor Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by a big four accounting firm, zero 
otherwise. Big four accounting firms include Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Venture capitalist Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture backed, zero otherwise. 
Top-tier underwriter Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has reputable underwriters, zero otherwise. 
Reputable underwriters are those with a ranking score of 8.0 or above based on Jay 
Ritter’s underwriter rakings.** 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book value of total assets in the fiscal year 
before the offering. 
Retained earnings Ratio of retained earnings to common equity in the fiscal year before the offering. 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has more than one business segment, zero 
otherwise. 
Business segment Number of the firm's business segments. 






Table 1. Distribution of IPOs by issue year and industry 
This table presents the sample distribution of IPO firms over the period 2003–2011 by issue year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel 
B). N denotes the number of observations. 
 






(N = 467) 
 
IPOs with a non-financial 
expert CEO 
(N = 340) 
 
IPOs with a financial 
expert CEO 
(N = 127) 
 
 N % N % N % 
2003 25 5 16 5 9 7 
2004 85 18 63 19 22 17 
2005 70 15 49 14 21 17 
2006 79 17 57 17 22 17 
2007 84 18 63 19 21 17 
2008 12 3 8 2 4 3 
2009 29 6 21 6 8 6 
2010 41 9 28 8 13 10 
2011 42 9 35 10 7 6 
 
Panel B: IPO distribution by industry 
 
Industry name SIC codes 
 
All IPOs  IPOs with a non- 
financial expert CEO 
 
IPOs with a financial 
expert CEO 
 
 N % N % N % 
Oil and gas 13 22 5 15 4 7 6 
Food products 20 4 1 3 1 1 1 
Chemical products 28 90 19 70 21 20 16 
Manufacturing 30–34 16 3 14 4 2 2 
Computer equipment & services 35, 73 113 24 70 21 43 34 
Electronic equipment 36 40 9 34 10 6 5 
Scientific instruments 38 44 9 34 10 10 8 
Transportation and public utilities 42, 44–49 38 8 30 9 8 6 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-59 37 8 24 7 13 10 
Entertainment services 70, 79 3 1 2 1 1 1 
Health services 80 11 2 8 2 3 2 
01, 12, 17, 23–       
All others 27, 29, 37, 39, 49 10 36 11 13 10 
72, 82, 87, 96       




Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and the sub-samples of IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert CEOs over the period 2003–2011. The CEO 
characteristics, firm and offering characteristics, and correlation matrix are illustrated in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Wilcoxon sign rank tests are used to test the 
difference of medians from zero. Tests of differences in means and medians between the two sub-samples are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: CEO characteristics             








 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Financial expertise             
Financial expert CEO  467 0.27          
CFO  467 0.11          
Banker  467 0.05          
Auditor  467 0.03          
Accountant  467 0.02          
Treasurer  467 0.05          
VP of finance  467 0.03          
Other financial roles  467 0.13          
Professional qualification  467 0.05          
Other CEO characteristics             
CEO-Chairman  467 0.45 0.00 340 0.43 0.00 127 0.50 0.00 0.099 0.198 
CEO-Founder  467 0.07 0.00 340 0.07 0.00 127 0.08 0.00 0.382 0.763 
CEO ownership  453 10.79 4.70 330 10.48 4.65 123 11.62 4.70 0.265 0.817 
CEO tenure  458 4.98 4.04 332 4.99 4.08 126 4.94 3.98 0.451 0.560 







Table 1, cont’d. 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
           








N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Firm characteristics            
Firm age 467 19.11 10.00 340 19.87 10.00 127 17.07 10.00 0.139 0.577 
Total assets 467 475.04 77.54 340 500.14 76.35 127 407.84 89.55 0.312 0.341 
Market value 467 567.75 326.25 340 543.73 319.06 127 632.06 349.50 0.203 0.773 
Big4 auditor 467 0.85 1.00 340 0.86 1.00 127 0.83 1.00 0.284 0.568 
Top-tier underwriter 465 0.68 1.00 339 0.70 1.00 126 0.65 1.00 0.175 0.350 
Venture capitalist 467 0.53 1.00 340 0.55 1.00 127 0.46 0.00 0.032 0.064 
Leverage 467 0.78 0.66 340 0.81 0.67 127 0.69 0.64 0.065 0.505 
ROA 467 -0.26 0.00 340 -0.28 -0.01 127 -0.21 0.00 0.211 0.414 
R&D 417 0.12 0.03 297 0.13 0.04 120 0.10 0.01 0.072 0.026 
Retained earnings 417 -0.58 -0.22 297 -0.81 -0.25 120 -0.03 -0.16 0.159 0.101 
Diversification 467 0.18 0.00 340 0.17 0.00 127 0.19 0.00 0.322 0.643 
Business segment 414 1.52 1.00 298 1.51 1.00 116 1.56 1.00 0.351 0.779 
Earnings management proxies 
           
Abnormal accruals 467 0.01 0.01* 340 0.02 0.01*** 127 -0.02 -0.01 0.000 0.000 
Abnormal cash flow from operations 451 0.08 0.01* 330 0.12 0.02*** 121 -0.03 -0.05 0.013 0.005 
Abnormal production costs 427 -0.06 -0.07*** 317 -0.01 -0.06* 110 -0.22 -0.13*** 0.008 0.049 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 429 -0.44 -0.23*** 318 -0.42 -0.19*** 111 -0.50 -0.29*** 0.240 0.395 
REM1 410 -0.50 -0.21*** 306 -0.43 -0.16*** 104 -0.72 -0.37*** 0.037 0.068 








Table 1, Cont’d. 
 
Panel C: Correlation matrix  
 Financial 
expert CEO 
Log(age) Log(assets) Big4 auditor 
Top-tier 
underwriter Venture capitalist Leverage ROA 
Financial expert CEO 1.000        
Log(age) -0.037 1.000       
Log(assets) 0.035 0.466 1.000      
Big4 auditor -0.027 0.041 0.149 1.000     
Top-tier underwriter -0.043 0.107 0.230 0.263 1.000    
Venture capitalist -0.086 -0.472 -0.423 0.203 0.109 1.000   
Leverage -0.070 0.088 -0.099 -0.052 -0.029 -0.165 1.000  
ROA 0.037 0.223 0.476 0.013 0.118 -0.123 -0.547 1.000 
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Table 3. Regressions of financial expert CEOs on earnings management 
This table illustrates the effect of financial expert CEOs on earnings management around IPOs. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 







Financial expert CEO -0.038*** -0.102** -0.235*** -0.166* -0.394** -0.271*** 
 (-4.35) (-2.05) (-2.61) (-1.84) (-2.43) (-2.85) 
Log(age) -0.004 -0.013 0.114 0.224* 0.360* 0.201 
 (-0.34) (-0.16) (1.23) (1.95) (1.94) (1.51) 
Log(assets) -0.015** -0.035 0.046 0.210** 0.244 0.168 
 (-2.06) (-0.77) (0.65) (2.31) (1.64) (1.58) 
Big4 auditor 0.000 0.063 -0.102 -0.284** -0.433** -0.226* 
 (0.03) (1.13) (-1.04) (-2.49) (-2.41) (-1.83) 
Top-tier underwriter -0.005 -0.145** -0.056 0.110 0.094 -0.046 
 (-0.53) (-2.32) (-0.65) (0.98) (0.52) (-0.36) 
Venture capitalist -0.019* 0.015 -0.127 -0.302*** -0.426** -0.285** 
 (-1.83) (0.26) (-1.28) (-2.86) (-2.26) (-2.24) 
Leverage 0.012* 0.041 -0.230*** -0.271*** -0.514*** -0.220** 
 (1.84) (0.89) (-3.24) (-3.19) (-3.58) (-2.25) 
ROA 0.019** -0.350*** -0.356*** 0.227* -0.141 -0.116 
 (2.10) (-6.27) (-3.57) (1.66) (-0.66) (-0.98) 
Intercept 0.058** 0.113 0.058 -0.465** -0.392 -0.320 
 (2.55) (0.99) (0.27) (-2.17) (-1.02) (-1.18) 
Number of observations 
465 
449 425 427 408 427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050 0.319 0.091 0.254 0.117 0.067 
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Table 4. Endogeneity control – Propensity score matching 
This table illustrates the analysis of the effect of financial expert CEOs on earnings management around IPOs, controlling for the endogeneity of CEO selection using propensity score matching 
approach. The variables used for matching include log(age), log(assets), ROA, R&D, retained earnings, diversification, and business segment All variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 








(Financial expert vs. Non-financial expert) 
-0.035*** -0.172** -0.206* -0.261* -0.484** -0.260* 
(-2.82) (-2.00) (-1.66) (-1.90) (-2.00) (-1.65) 
 
















     Table 5. Analysis of the interaction effect between CEO financial experience and CEO power 
This table illustrates the effect of financial expert CEOs on earnings management around IPOs, controlling for the interaction effect between CEO financial experience and CEO power. All regressions 
control for industry and year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed. CEO power is measured as the sum of the standardized variables: CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO ownership, CEO 
tenure, and Ivy League graduate. All variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Test statistics are shown in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 







Financial expert CEO -0.038*** -0.101* -0.218** -0.164* -0.367** -0.269*** 
 (-4.20) (-1.96) (-2.39) (-1.79) (-2.27) (-2.80) 
Financial expert CEO * CEO power -0.006** -0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.020 -0.014 
 (-2.08) (-0.80) (-0.32) (-0.06) (-0.39) (-0.46) 
CEO power 0.003* -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 
 (1.86) (-0.10) (-0.57) (-0.13) (-0.31) (-0.19) 
Log(age) -0.006 -0.022 0.150 0.197 0.381* 0.166 
 (-0.55) (-0.27) (1.49) (1.65) (1.90) (1.16) 
Log(assets) -0.011 -0.018 0.070 0.199** 0.264* 0.175 
 (-1.61) (-0.38) (0.93) (2.18) (1.68) (1.62) 
Big4 auditor -0.004 0.048 -0.069 -0.201* -0.317* -0.162 
 (-0.30) (0.86) (-0.74) (-1.85) (-1.81) (-1.30) 
Top-tier underwriter -0.005 -0.143** -0.034 0.115 0.124 -0.039 
 (-0.49) (-2.25) (-0.39) (1.02) (0.67) (-0.30) 
Venture capitalist -0.021** 0.001 -0.091 -0.268** -0.347* -0.268** 
 (-1.99) (0.02) (-0.89) (-2.48) (-1.77) (-2.03) 
Leverage 0.010 0.022 -0.229*** -0.260*** -0.502*** -0.228** 
 (1.56) (0.43) (-3.03) (-3.44) (-3.70) (-2.52) 
ROA 0.012 -0.404*** -0.357** 0.349*** -0.029 -0.049 
 (1.53) (-6.08) (-2.53) (3.08) (-0.12) (-0.40) 
Intercept 0.059*** 0.110 -0.112 -0.504** -0.637 -0.355 
 (2.62) (0.93) (-0.54) (-2.25) (-1.56) (-1.28) 
Number of observations 443 429 407 408 391 408 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.282 0.061 0.270 0.127 0.070 
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Table 6. Alternative measures of CEO financial expertise – CFO experience, financial experience variety, and professional qualification 
This table illustrates the analyses of the effect of CEOs’ past experience as a CFO, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications on earnings management around IPOs. All regressions 
control for industry and year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: CFO experience       







CFO experience -0.022* -0.172** -0.357*** -0.145 -0.527** -0.326** 
 (-1.83) (-2.56) (-2.89) (-1.15) (-2.39) (-2.39) 
Log(age) 0.001 0.002 0.142 0.245** 0.402** 0.235* 
 (0.08) (0.02) (1.54) (2.15) (2.18) (1.81) 
Log(assets) -0.016** -0.038 0.043 0.209** 0.242 0.164 
 (-2.19) (-0.84) (0.62) (2.30) (1.64) (1.56) 
Big4 auditor 0.001 0.068 -0.095 -0.284** -0.426** -0.222* 
 (0.05) (1.19) (-0.96) (-2.49) (-2.37) (-1.80) 
Top-tier underwriter -0.004 -0.141** -0.043 0.115 0.114 -0.037 
 (-0.39) (-2.27) (-0.50) (1.04) (0.64) (-0.28) 
Venture capitalist -0.016 0.019 -0.115 -0.286*** -0.402** -0.266** 
 (-1.51) (0.34) (-1.16) (-2.66) (-2.11) (-2.08) 
Leverage 0.014** 0.043 -0.225*** -0.265*** -0.503*** -0.212** 
 (2.04) (0.93) (-3.08) (-3.08) (-3.43) (-2.14) 
ROA 0.019** -0.348*** -0.355*** 0.229 -0.136 -0.112 
 (2.10) (-6.30) (-3.37) (1.64) (-0.61) (-0.91) 
Intercept 0.042* 0.085 -0.015 -0.529** -0.518 -0.411 
 (1.93) (0.77) (-0.07) (-2.55) (-1.40) (-1.58) 
Number of observations 465 449 425 427 408 427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.018 0.321 0.094 0.251 0.116 0.064 
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Table 6, cont’d. 
 
Panel B: Financial experience variety 
      







Financial experience variety dummy -0.022** -0.108* -0.263** -0.131 -0.429** -0.250** 
 (-2.03) (-1.77) (-2.37) (-1.25) (-2.26) (-2.15) 
Log(age) 0.002 0.008 0.159* 0.255** 0.439** 0.255* 
 (0.20) (0.10) (1.72) (2.24) (2.38) (1.96) 
Log(assets) -0.016** -0.039 0.041 0.208** 0.237 0.163 
 (-2.20) (-0.84) (0.59) (2.28) (1.60) (1.54) 
Big4 auditor 0.001 0.069 -0.091 -0.282** -0.421** -0.220* 
 (0.08) (1.21) (-0.92) (-2.47) (-2.34) (-1.77) 
Top-tier underwriter -0.004 -0.144** -0.051 0.113 0.104 -0.041 
 (-0.45) (-2.30) (-0.59) (1.02) (0.58) (-0.32) 
Venture capitalist -0.016 0.020 -0.115 -0.286*** -0.398** -0.263** 
 (-1.52) (0.36) (-1.15) (-2.67) (-2.09) (-2.05) 
Leverage 0.014** 0.043 -0.225*** -0.265*** -0.504*** -0.212** 
 (2.01) (0.94) (-3.08) (-3.08) (-3.43) (-2.13) 
ROA 0.019** -0.348*** -0.353*** 0.229 -0.134 -0.111 
 (2.11) (-6.28) (-3.35) (1.64) (-0.60) (-0.90) 
Intercept 0.042* 0.075 -0.029 -0.536** -0.544 -0.431* 
 (1.92) (0.67) (-0.14) (-2.58) (-1.46) (-1.65) 
Number of observations 465 449 425 427 408 427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.317 0.088 0.251 0.114 0.061 
 
 
  Pairwise correlation      










Number of firms 1.000    
Number of roles 0.912 1.000   
Financial experience in another firm 0.860 0.772 1.000  
Financial experience duration 0.823 0.746 0.747 1.000 
 
  First component: Eigenvalue of 3.433 and proportion explained of 0.858  
 Loadings 
Number of firms 0.525 
Number of roles 0.500 
Financial experience in another firm 0.492 






Table 6, cont’d. 
 
Panel C: Professional qualification 







Professional qualification -0.030* -0.023 -0.046 0.066 0.025 0.037 
 (-1.86) (-0.42) (-0.30) (0.45) (0.08) (0.26) 
Log(age) -0.000 -0.001 0.140 0.249** 0.411** 0.239* 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (1.53) (2.17) (2.22) (1.82) 
Log(assets) -0.015** -0.037 0.047 0.209** 0.248* 0.169 
 (-2.05) (-0.80) (0.66) (2.29) (1.66) (1.58) 
Big4 auditor 0.001 0.063 -0.113 -0.296*** -0.459** -0.242* 
 (0.10) (1.10) (-1.14) (-2.59) (-2.56) (-1.96) 
Top-tier underwriter -0.005 -0.142** -0.049 0.117 0.109 -0.037 
 (-0.48) (-2.26) (-0.56) (1.04) (0.60) (-0.28) 
Venture capitalist -0.016 0.027 -0.099 -0.273** -0.369* -0.242* 
 (-1.48) (0.49) (-0.99) (-2.58) (-1.94) (-1.89) 
Leverage 0.015** 0.046 -0.217*** -0.263*** -0.494*** -0.207** 
 (2.16) (1.00) (-2.92) (-3.05) (-3.33) (-2.06) 
ROA 0.020** -0.348*** -0.354*** 0.227 -0.139 -0.115 
 (2.16) (-6.26) (-3.37) (1.62) (-0.62) (-0.93) 
Intercept 0.040* 0.064 -0.051 -0.554*** -0.593 -0.462* 
 (1.83) (0.57) (-0.24) (-2.64) (-1.54) (-1.73) 
Number of observations 465 449 425 427 408 427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.017 0.313 0.074 0.250 0.103 0.053 
       
  
 
